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Abstract: Role-based access control (RBAC) is a powerful means for laying out and 
developing higher-level organizational policies such as separation of duty, and for 
simplifying the security management process. One of the important aspects of RBAC is 
authorization constraints that express such organizational policies. While RBAC has 
generated a great interest in the security community, organizations still seek a flexible and 
effective approach to impose role-based authorization constraints in their security-critical 
applications. In particular, today often only basic RBAC concepts have found their way 
into commercial RBAC products; specifically, authorization constraints are not widely 
supported. In this paper, we present an RBAC administration tool that can enforce certain 
kinds of role-based authorization constraints such as separation of duty constraints. The 
authorization constraint functionality is based upon the OCL validation tool USE. We also 
describe our practical experience that we gained on integrating OCL functionality into a 
prototype of an RBAC administration tool that shall be extended to a product in the future. 
 
Keywords: Authorization constraints, Object Constraint Language, Role-based access 
control 
1 Introduction 
Employing access control mechanisms in medium to large scale organizations always has been 
crucial. One of the challenging jobs for security-critical organizations, such as financial 
institutes, hospitals and, government agencies is to control access to system resources at the 
highest level without violating the underlying access control policies. The research in recent 
years has brought role-based access control (RBAC) [1, 2, 3] as an efficient and flexible model 
for controlling access to computer resources (such as files or data base tables) and enforcing 
the organizational policies. In the RBAC model, users acquire permissions on resources via 
roles, and not directly. 
                                                   
*
 This work was supported in part by the German Research Foundation (DFG) under the grant SO 515/2-1 and by 
the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research under the grant FKZ01ISF19B (ORKA project). 
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As pointed out by Ferraiolo et al. [4], one of the main advantages of RBAC is that higher-
level organizational rules can be implemented in a natural way. Specifically, advanced RBAC 
concepts like role-based authorization constraints and role hierarchies are a powerful means 
for laying out higher-level organizational rules [1]. Common types of authorization constraints 
are separation of duty (SoD) constraints [5, 6], cardinality constraints [1], and context 
constraints [7, 8]. 
Although the importance of authorization constraints1 has long been pointed out [1, 9], 
advanced RBAC concepts are rarely well-supported in commercial RBAC products. In this 
paper, we demonstrate how authorization constraints can be implemented in a prototype of an 
RBAC administration tool. Specifically, we concentrate on static SoD constraints and role 
hierarchies. The prototype of the RBAC administration tool has been developed in the research 
and development project ORKA (Organizational Control Architecture) [21] comprised of 
various academic and industrial research partners (among the partners are SAP AG and 
Fraunhofer). In the future, it is envisioned to integrate this functionality into a real product 
made available by the Parks Informatik company [10]. 
Technically, the authorization constraints are implemented by employing functionality of 
the USE tool (UML-based Specification Environment), a validation tool for UML-/OCL-
models [11]. With the help of this approach, authorization constraints are formulated as OCL 
invariants, and USE then checks whether the current system/security state satisfies the defined 
authorization constraints. The approach is based on our earlier works and is described in more 
detail elsewhere [12]. 
In this paper, we concentrate more on our practical experience employing a general-purpose 
OCL tool within the frameworks of a project with industrial partners. Specifically, we show 
that OCL tools such as USE can be employed in real-world industrial projects. However, we 
also demonstrate the problems we encountered by integrating the USE functionality with the 
RBAC administration tool. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we provide a brief 
overview of related concepts and technologies. Section 3 presents our UML/OCL model of 
RBAC. In Section 4, we describe our implementation of authorization constraints with the help 
of the USE tool. We also describe our experience on employing USE in an industrial project. 
An overview of related work is given in Section 5. We outline our conclusions and future work 
in Section 6. 
2 Related Concepts and Technologies 
In this section, we first describe the RBAC concepts with the focus of authorization 
constraints. Thereafter, we explain the main functionality of USE. 
2.1 RBAC and Authorization Constraints 
RBAC [1, 2] has gained much attention as a promising alternative to traditional discretionary 
and mandatory access control. It is an access control model in which the security 
administration can be simplified by the use of roles to organize the access privileges and 
ultimately reduces the complexity and cost of security administration [2]. Here we give an 
                                                   
1
 In the following, we use the term “authorization constraint” instead of “role-based authorization constraint” for the 
sake of simplicity. 
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overview of the components of RBAC96, a widely used RBAC model introduced by Sandhu 
et al. [1]: 
• the sets U, R, P, S (users, roles, permissions, and sessions, respectively) 
• UA ⊆  U× R (user to role assignment relation) 
• PA ⊆  P × R (permission to role assignment relation) 
• RH ⊆  R× R is a partial order called the role hierarchy relation. 
A user can be a member of many roles and a role can have many users. Similarly, a role can 
have many permissions and the same permissions can be assigned to many roles. A user may 
activate a subset of roles he or she is assigned to in a session.  The permissions available to the 
users are the union of permissions from all roles activated in that session. Role hierarchies can 
be formed by the RH relation. Senior roles inherit permissions from junior roles through the 
RH relation (e.g., the role chief physician inherits all permissions from the physician role). 
Authorization constraints are an important aspect of RBAC and are sometimes considered to 
be the principal motivation behind RBAC. The goal of authorization constraints is not only to 
reduce the risk of fraud or a security breach but to increase the opportunity of detecting errors 
within an organizational security structure. Authorization constraints may need to be imposed 
on the RBAC functions and relations in order to prevent the information misuse and fraudulent 
activities. In the literature, several kinds of authorization constraints have been identified such 
as various types of static and dynamic SoD constraints [5, 6]; cardinality constraints [1]; 
context constraints [7, 8]. 
Specifically, SoD is a fundamental principle in security systems and is typically considered 
as a requirement that, operations are divided among two or more persons so that no single 
individual can compromise the security. SoD constraints are used to enforce conflict of interest 
policies. One means of preventing conflict of interest is through static SoD, that is, to enforce 
constraints on the assignment of users to roles. On the other hand, the dynamic SoD 
constraints limit the permissions that are available to a user by placing constraints on the roles 
that can be activated within or across a user's sessions. 
2.2 The USE tool 
USE allows the software modeller to validate UML and OCL descriptions and is the only OCL 
tool allowing interactive monitoring of OCL invariants and pre- and postconditions, and the 
automatic generation of non-trivial system states. These system states or system snapshots 
consist of the current objects and links between those objects adhering to the UML model in 
question. 
The central idea of the USE tool is to check for software quality criteria like correct 
functionality of UML descriptions already in the design level in an implementation-
independent manner. This approach takes advantage of descriptive design level specifications 
by expressing properties concisely and in a more abstract way. Such properties are given by 
invariants and pre- and postconditions, and these are checked by the USE tool against the 
generated snapshots, i.e., object diagrams and operation calls given by sequence diagrams, 
which the developer provides. These abstract design level tests are expected to be also used 
later in the implementation phase. 
The USE tool expects as an input a textual description of a model and its OCL constraints. 
After syntax checks, the model can be displayed by the graphical user interface provided by 
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USE. In particular, USE makes available a project browser which displays all the classes, 
associations, invariants, and pre- and post-conditions of the current model. 
 
 
Figure 1. Screenshot of the USE tool. 
Figure 1 shows a USE screenshot with an example. On the left, we see the project browser 
displaying the classes, associations, invariants, and operation pre- and post-conditions. In a 
detail window below, the selected class is pictured with all details. On the right, we identify a 
sequence diagram presenting the operations which lead to the current system state given in the 
object diagram window below. The evaluation of the invariants in this system state is pictured 
in the class invariant window to the right of the object diagram window. The developer gets 
feedback from USE about the validity of the invariants in the class invariant window and the 
validity of the pre- and post-conditions in the sequence diagram window. 
3 Specifying RBAC in UML and OCL 
Subsequently, we demonstrate how RBAC including authorization constraints can be specified 
in UML and OCL. Specifically, the RBAC element sets and relations are modeled in textual 
UML (which is defined within the USE tool), and the authorization constraints are specified in 
OCL. Owing to the fact that OCL can be used to express the authorization constraints formally 
and precisely, a validation tool such as USE can be applied to recognize violations of such 
constraints. Hence, one advantage of our approach is that USE can be employed both for 
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validation and enforcement RBAC policies2. The last point is discussed in the following 
section in more detail. 
  
Figure 2. USE specification of an RBAC policy. 
In Figure 2, we show a simple RBAC policy, which is represented as a USE specification. 
The USE specification consists of two parts. In the first part, the RBAC-related classes and 
association definitions are formulated in textual UML. This part is a generic encoding of 
RBAC. The second part then contains the domain-specific authorization constraints formulated 
in OCL. Specifically, we here define two constraints. The first is a Simple Static SoD 
(SimpleSSoD) constraint between two roles “Cashier” and “Cashier Supervisor”, i.e., a user 
must not be assigned to both roles. The second constraint is of type Simple Permission-Based 
Static SoD (SimplePSSoD) stating that conflicting permissions cannot have a common role. 
Otherwise, the role in question would not be useful or even introduce a security hole. Both 
constraints are later used to explain our RBAC administration tool. 
The RBAC policy depicted in Figure 2 is only meant for didactic purposes; it by no means 
is a complete policy that the authorization engine implements. For example, we left out the 
OCL constraints representing the partial order conditions of role hierarchies. In addition, a lot 
of (mostly more complex) SoD constraints as those defined in [5, 6] can be specified in OCL. 
                                                   
2
 At minimum, an RBAC policy is comprised of users, roles, permissions, role hierarchies, user and permission 
assignment relations, as well as various constraints on those relations such as authorization and integrity 
constraints (cf. [12]). 
model RBAC 
 
--classes 
 
class Role 
attributes 
id:String 
end 
 
class User 
attributes 
id:String 
end 
 
class Permission 
attributes 
op:Operation 
o:Object 
end 
 
class Object 
attributes 
id:String 
end 
 
class Operation 
attributes 
id:String 
end 
 
class Session 
attributes 
id:String 
end 
 
-- associations 
association UA between 
User[*] role user 
Role[*] role role_ 
end 
 
association PA between 
Permission[*] role permission 
Role[*] role role_ 
end  
 
 
 
association establishes between 
User[1] role user 
Session[*] role session 
end 
 
 
association activates between 
Session[*] role session 
Role[*] role role_ 
end 
 
association RH between 
Role[*] role senior 
Role[*] role junior 
end 
 
Constraints 
 
-- Simple Static SoD  
context User inv SimpleSSoD: 
let 
  Clerk:Role=Role.allInstances->any(id='Clerk'), 
  Supervisor:Role=Role.allInstances->any(id='Supervisor'), 
  CR:Set(Role)=Set{Clerk, Supervisor} 
in 
  self.role_->intersection(CR)->size()< CR->size() 
 
-- Simple Permission-Based Static SoD 
context Role inv SimplePSSoD: 
let 
  loan:Object=Object.allInstances->any(id='loan'), 
  prepare:Operation=Operation.allInstances->any 
    (id='prepare'), 
  approve:Operation=Operation.allInstances->any 
    (id='approve'), 
  approve_loan:Permission=Permission.allInstances->any 
    (op=approve and o=loan), 
  prepare_loan:Permission=Permission.allInstances->any 
    (op=prepare and o=loan), 
  cp: Set(Permission)=Set{prepare_loan, approve_loan} 
in 
  cp->intersection(self.permission)->size() < cp->size()  
 
-- further authorization constraints … 
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4 Integrating USE Functionality into an RBAC Administration Tool 
In previous works [12, 21], we demonstrated how to implement an authorization software with 
the help of the OCL validation tool USE. This approach has several advantages. 
 
 
Figure 3. ORKA-Admin tool. 
First, one can utilize the benefits of the light-weight formalism OCL. Hence, a security 
officer can specify access control policies (i.e., sets of authorization constraints) in a 
declarative way. Thereafter, she can employ USE to validate this access control policy, for 
example, to detect missing or conflicting constraints under certain circumstances [12]. Last but 
not least, one can employ the USE functionality directly to implement/enforce the 
authorization constraints. Due to the fact that we use a general-purpose validation tool for 
OCL constraints new authorization constraint types can easily be added to the system. For 
example, if the access control policy must support cardinality constraints, one only has to 
specify (a template) for that new constraint type in OCL, and the authorization software can 
enforce the authorization constraint type. 
In the following, we describe in more detail how the USE functionality is integrated with 
the RBAC administration tool made available in the ORKA project.  
4.1 The RBAC Administration Tool 
To reduce the complexity of security management an administrative interface is necessary to 
support an administrator to define, manage and analyze security policies and to trigger policy 
validation to detect inconsistencies and conflicts that may be violating underlying constraints. 
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Therefore, the ORKA-Admin tool, an RBAC policy administration tool, is being developed as 
part of the ORKA project. 
In Figure 3, a screenshot of the ORKA-Admin tool is shown. The tool provides 
functionality for creating and managing RBAC policies. At the core, it supports standard 
RBAC administrative functions, such as creating users, roles, permissions, role hierarchies, 
assignment relations, and defining authorization constraints. While authorization constraints 
play a crucial role in enforcing organizational rules, they must be satisfied throughout the 
administration process. We take this fact into consideration by integrating USE validation 
functionality into the ORKA-Admin tool. The details are given later in Section 4.2. The USE 
validation primarily checks whether an RBAC policy satisfies the defined authorization 
constraints. 
 
 
Figure 4. Components of the ORKA-Admin tool. 
There are two types of USE validation that can be triggered from within the ORKA-Admin 
tool. First, the full validation of an RBAC policy, that is, an administrator can explicitly 
validate a complete RBAC policy. All possible conflicts that are detected by the validation 
process are reported back to the administrator in a user friendly manner. Second, we have an 
implicit operation-specific validation, that is, for each administrative operation, such as 
assigning permission(s) to a role, the USE validation is triggered automatically which checks 
only those conflicts that are caused by or are specific to the administrative operation in 
question. 
Within the ORKA-Admin environment, the RBAC polices are usually analyzed, modified 
and validated as the working versions. Once the policies are validated, they can be deployed as 
production versions. 
4.2 Architectural Overview 
In this section, we provide more details regarding the components of the ORKA-Admin tool, 
specifically focusing on how the USE validation functionality is integrated.  In Figure 4, an 
overview of the components of ORKA-Admin tool is given. The AdminGUI is a central place 
Policy Storage 
 
AdminGUI 
Policy object 
Validation results 
USE 
Validation 
Component 
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for all administrative activities. Internally within the ORKA-Admin environment, an RBAC 
policy is referred as policy object or ORKA policy object. It could also be called simply ORKA 
policy. The policy objects are saved into and retrieved from the central Policy Storage as XML 
documents, such as shown in Figure 5. The policy objects are validated automatically or 
explicitly on the behalf of the policy administrator by means of the USEValidationComponent. 
 
 
Figure 5. Fragment of a banking policy object. 
The AdminGUI is a J2EE-based Seam application whereas the Policy Storage is a MySQL 
database server. The USEValidationComponent is built around the Java API made available by 
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<policy_object> 
  <policy_object_modules> 
    <module_rbac_core_policy> 
      <users> 
        <user user_id="Jennifer" /> 
        <user user_id="Smith" /> 
        <user user_id="Suzanne" /> 
      </users> 
      <roles> 
        <role role_id="Clerk" /> 
        <role role_id="Supervisor" /> 
        <role role_id="Manager" /> 
        <role role_id="Customer" /> 
      </roles> 
      <permissions> 
        <permission permission_id="approve_loan"> 
          <operation operation_id="approve" /> 
          <object object_id="Loan" /> 
        </permission> 
        <permission permission_id="prepare_loan"> 
          <operation operation_id="approve" /> 
          <object object_id="Loan" /> 
        </permission> 
        <permission permission_id="query_customer_data"> 
          <operation operation_id="query" /> 
          <object object_id="CustomerData" /> 
        </permission> 
      </permissions> 
      <user_assignments> 
        <user_assignment user_id="Jennifer" role_id="Manager" /> 
        <user_assignment user_id="Suzanne" role_id="Supervisor" /> 
      </user_assignments> 
      <permission_assignments> 
        <permission_assignment permission_id="approve_loan" role_id="Supervisor" /> 
        <permission_assignment permission_id="approve_loan" role_id="Manager" /> 
        <permission_assignment permission_id="query_customer_data" role_id="Clerk" /> 
        <permission_assignment permission_id="prepare_loan" role_id="Clerk" /> 
      </permission_assignments> 
    </module_rbac_core_policy> 
    <module_sep_duty_policy> 
      <simple_static_separation_of_duty> 
        <critical_role_sets> 
          <critical_role_set cardinality="1"> 
            <critical_roles> 
              <critical_role role_id="Clerk" /> 
              <critical_role role_id="Supervisor" /> 
            </critical_roles> 
          </critical_role_set> 
        </critical_role_sets> 
      </simple_static_separation_of_duty> 
      <static_separation_of_duty_attached_to_permissions> 
        <critical_permission_sets> 
          <critical_permission_set cardinality="1"> 
            <critical_permissions> 
              <critical_permission permission_id="prepare_loan" /> 
              <critical_permission permission_id="approve_loan" /> 
            </critical_permissions> 
          </critical_permission_set> 
        </critical_permission_sets> 
      </static_separation_of_duty_attached_to_permissions> 
    </module_sep_duty_policy> 
  </policy_object_modules> 
</policy_object> 
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USE.  The AdminGUI and the USEValidationComponent communicate with each other 
through a common interface PolicyValidatorInterface. 
4.2.1 Policy Representation Format 
As indicated earlier, the ORKA-Admin tool internally uses XML to compose and store ORKA 
policies. An ORKA policy object in XML is the container for all policy rules of a particular 
application domain. There may be different policy objects for the various application domains. 
Each policy object is specified within a single XML file, which contains all policy rules. 
However, each policy object must conform to a central DTD (document type definition) which 
defines the syntax of the policy. That means the DTD provides a framework for the definition 
of syntactically correct policies in XML. Therefore, each policy object created or modified 
within the ORKA-Admin tool is validated against the central DTD. 
In Figure 5, a fragment of a banking policy object is presented, which is created and 
exported from the ORKA-Admin tool. This policy object is only for didactic purposes, which 
by no means is a complete policy object that can be created, managed and validated (USE 
validation) by the tool. The policy object format allows specifying users, roles, permissions, 
role hierarchies, assignments relations and specifically various authorization constraints. For 
example all types of separation of duty constraints are specified within the module3 
<module_sep_duty_policy>. For Simple Static SoD (SimpleSSoD) and Strict Static 
SoD (StrictSSoD), we have an element <critical_role_sets> which holds all the 
<critical_role_set> elements of the particular type. A <critical_role_set> 
element contains the element <critical_roles> which includes the critical roles as 
<critical_role> elements. Additionally, the <critical_role_set> has a 
mandatory attribute cardinality which specifies the cardinality of the respective role set. 
For instance, in Figure 5 (lines 44-49), a constraint of type SimpleSSoD is specified, which 
informally means that no user is allowed to be assigned to the critical role set comprised of the 
Clerk and Supervisor roles. Similarly, lines 54-59 of Figure 5 show a Simple 
Permission-Based Static SoD (SimplePSSoD) constraint, which states that the critical 
permission set comprised of prepare_loan and approve_loan cannot be assigned to 
the same role. 
More complex authorization constraints, including role hierarchies and associated 
constraints such as partial order constraints (e.g., anti-symmetry and transitivity) can be 
created by using the ORKA-Admin interface, which are internally stored in the respective 
policy object. 
4.2.2 USE Validation 
Although the ORKA-Admin tool implements a user interface to create and manage policy 
objects that are internally stored in the XML format, a critical requirement is to validate the 
policy objects, specifically, whether the policy objects satisfy all the defined authorization 
constraints. The validation must be carried out on the policy objects before they are deployed 
as production versions. The USEValidationComponent is developed around the Java API 
provided by USE and integrated into the ORKA-Admin tool, which facilitates validating the 
                                                   
3
 Within the ORKA project several modules containing exact specification(s) of authorization constraint types are 
provided. 
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policy objects and sending back immediate feedback to the AdminGUI to reduce 
administrative mistakes. 
As pointed out before, the OKRA-Admin tool supports an implicit operation-specific 
validation as well as an explicit full validation that can be triggered by the administrator at any 
time. In case of full validation, the AdminGUI sends a complete policy object as an XML 
string to the USEValidationComponent. However, in case of operation-specific validation, the 
operation-specific parameters are also sent along with the policy object. 
On receiving the validation request from the AdminGUI, the USEValidationComponent 
carries out the following steps:  
1. It initializes an internal USE model comprised of various classes and associations, 
such as those shown in Figure 2. From the USE model, it also instantiates a USE 
system representing a single ORKA policy object. This USE system allows one to 
create, preserve and manipulate unique objects of type Role, User and 
Permission, as well as the association links such as UA, PA and RH as shown in 
Figure 2. 
2. The authorization constraints are read from the policy object, transformed into 
equivalent OCL invariants with respect to the specifications given in policy object 
modules, and uniquely created into the USE model. For example, from Figure 5 the 
SimpleSSoD (lines 44-49) and SimplePSSoD (lines 54-59) constraints will be 
translated as SimpleSSoD and SimplePSSoD OCL invariants, respectively, as 
shown in Figure 2. 
3. The concrete roles, users and permissions are read from the policy object, and 
corresponding unique objects of type Role, User and Permission are created 
in the current USE system state. For example, a unique user object, say, user_clerk 
of type User will be created for the user <user user_id="Jennifer" /> 
as specified in the policy object in Figure 5. The id of the object user_clerk will be 
set to “Jennifer”. 
4. The role hierarchy, user assignment, and permission assignment relations are read 
from the policy object and are created as respective association links in the current 
system state. While creating role hierarchy and assignment relations, the reflexive 
transitive closure is calculated. For instance, the USE system state contains the role 
hierarchy with all possible edges computed by the transitive closure algorithm.  
5. Finally, the USE system evaluates the current system state with respect to the 
existing invariants. If an explicit (full) validation is trigged by the ORKA-Admin 
tool, then all existing invariants are checked. In case of operation-specific 
validation, the invariants to be checked are selected on the basis of the 
administrative operation being invoked by the ORKA-Admin tool. For all violated 
invariants, the USEValidationComponent analyzes invariant types and generates 
specific messages to be sent back to the AdminGUI. Each message is formatted as 
an XML file and sent back to the AdminGUI as XML string, such as shown in 
Figure 6. OCL queries are applied directly on the USE system state to retrieve 
specific information wherever required. 
In the following section, we describe in more detail how various authorization constraints 
are implemented by the USEValidationComponent. Thereafter, more details regarding 
message generation and OCL queries are given in Section 4.4. 
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4.3 Implementing Static Authorization Constraints and Role Hierarchy Relations 
The USEValidationComponent of the ORKA-Admin tool implements various constraints that 
can be specified using the tool interface. Specifically, we implemented partial order constraints 
(e.g., anti-symmetry) and various static SoD constraints such as SimpleSSoD, StrictSSoD, 
SimplePSSoD and Strict Permission-Based SSoD (StrictPSSoD). 
The USEValidationComponent follows a template mechanism to implement the 
aforementioned constraint types. To describe it simply, a constraint template class (Java 
class) is defined for each type of authorization constraint. For instance, the 
SimplePSSoDConstraint template class implements constraints of type SimplePSSoD 
such as shown in Figure 5. The USEValidationComponent will therefore create a new instance 
of the SimplePSSoDConstraint template class for each SimplePSSoD constraint that is 
read from the policy object. These template instances which are capable of producing 
corresponding OCL invariants are preserved throughout the life cycle of the USE system. The 
OCL invariants are then added to the USE model accordingly. 
As an example of how template classes are instantiated for specific constraint types and 
what information they hold, consider the policy object shown in Figure 5, specifically, the 
SimplePSSoD constraint specified between lines 54-59. Within the USEValidationComponent 
an instance of the template class SimplePSSoDConstraint is created for the 
SimplePSSoD constraint, which at least holds the critical permission set. This instance can 
then be manipulated, for example, to produce the corresponding OCL invariant. In the current 
scenario, it will produce the following OCL invariant: 
 
context Role inv simplepssod_uniqueID: 
let 
  loan:Object=Object.allInstances->any(id='loan'), 
  prepare:Operation=Operation.allInstances->any 
    (id='prepare'), 
  approve:Operation=Operation.allInstances->any 
    (id='approve'), 
  approve_loan:Permission=Permission.allInstances->any 
    (op=approve and o=loan), 
  prepare_loan:Permission=Permission.allInstances->any 
    (op=prepare and o=loan), 
  cp: Set(Permission)=Set{prepare_loan, approve_loan} 
in 
  cp->intersection(self.permission)->size()< cp->size() 
 
In fact, within the USEValidationComponent, an instance of the template class 
SimplePSSoDConstraint will be created for each set of conflicting permissions 
specified in the policy object. The template class instances are used to produce corresponding 
OCL invariants, which have unique names within the USE model. When we create the OCL 
invariant in the USE model, the invariant is mapped to the template instance to which it 
belongs. This mapping is necessary for the later use while analyzing the violation of specific 
invariants and producing corresponding error messages. 
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4.4 Generating Error Messages 
The template classes described in the previous section are not bound to produce only OCL 
invariants. The template classes also hold a set of preformatted OCL queries that can be 
directly applied on the USE system state to retrieve specific information of the current USE 
system state. In particular, each template class is capable of producing specific warning/error 
messages when the OCL invariant, it refers to in the USE system state, is violated. While 
generating a specific error message, the template instance primarily uses the information it 
already holds. For example, an instance of class SimplePSSoDConstraint holds a 
critical permission set. In addition, it can apply OCL queries on the current USE system state 
to retrieve further information, if required. 
 
 
Figure 6. The ORKA-Admin tool showing an operation-specific USE validation result. 
Here we present two examples which describe the USE validation results. For the first 
example, an operation-specific USE validation scenario is depicted in Figure 6, which is based 
upon the policy object shown in Figure 5. In this case when an administrator tries to assign 
permission approve_loan to the role Clerk, then the operation-specific validation is 
automatically triggered. As a result, the policy object and operation-specific information, such 
as the operation name (AssignPermissionToRole) and attribute list, that is, the role Clerk and 
the permission approve_loan, is sent to the USEValidationComponent to check whether 
the current operation violates defined authorization constraint(s). The 
USEValidationComponent carries out different steps to initialize the USE model and the USE 
system as discussed earlier. In this specific case, while creating the permission assignment 
relations in the system, the permission approve_loan will also be assigned to the Role 
object whose id is set to “Clerk”. The same role object has already been assigned a 
permission prepare_loan which is based upon the information retrieved from the policy 
object. Within the USE system state, there now would be two Permission objects with the 
  
 ECEASST 
14 / 19 Volume 15 (2008) 
ids “prepare_loan” and “approve_loan”, and which are assigned to a Role object with the id 
“Clerk”. Hence, the Permission-Based Static SoD constraint is violated. 
Further, apart from other invariants, there would be an invariant such as 
simplepssod_uniqueID discussed in Section 4.2, which would always be mapped to the 
corresponding instance of the template class SimplePSSoDConstraint. When USE 
evaluates invariants in the current system state, the invariant simplepssod_uniqueID 
will be evaluated to false because within USE system state a Role object is assigned, at least, 
two Permission objects referring to the critical permissions “prepare_loan” and 
“approve_loan”. 
 
 
Figure 7. Fragment of an example policy object. 
 
 
Figure 8. Full validation result generated by USE validation from the example policy object. 
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<policy_object> 
  <policy_object_modules> 
    <module_rbac_core_policy> 
      <users> 
        <user user_id="Smith" /> 
      </users> 
      <roles> 
        <role role_id="Clerk" /> 
        <role role_id="Supervisor" /> 
      </roles> 
      <user_assignments> 
        <user_assignment user_id="Smith" role_id="Clerk" /> 
        <user_assignment user_id="Smith" role_id="Supervisor" /> 
      </user_assignments> 
    </module_rbac_core_policy> 
    <module_sep_duty_policy> 
      <simple_static_separation_of_duty> 
        <critical_role_sets> 
          <critical_role_set cardinality="1"> 
            <critical_roles> 
              <critical_role role_id="Clerk" /> 
              <critical_role role_id="Supervisor" /> 
            </critical_roles> 
          </critical_role_set> 
        </critical_role_sets> 
      </simple_static_separation_of_duty> 
    </module_sep_duty_policy> 
  </policy_object_modules> 
   </policy_object> 
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The USE system produces its own internal evaluation log for each invariant which is 
evaluated to false. The evaluation log can be analyzed to find the cause of the failure in detail. 
However, for the ORKA-Admin tool we need to produce specific messages for the violated 
constraints that are useful for an administrator. Therefore, in the scenario being discussed here, 
the USEValidationComponent would acquire the preserved instance of 
SimplePSSoDConstraint that is mapped to the violated invariant 
simplepssod_uniqueID. This way, the SimplePSSoDConstraint instance will 
generate an XML based message as shown in Figure 6. The SimplePSSoDConstraint 
instance does not execute any OCL query on the USE system state for any more information 
because it already holds the necessary information that is required to produce the message. In 
the current version of the ORKA-Admin tool the error messages displayed are complete XML 
strings. However, error messages are supposed to be further parsed to create hyperlinks to 
different elements such as users, roles and permissions to help an administrator to navigate to 
the linked elements. 
For the full validation case, we consider the example policy object shown in Figure 7. To 
keep it simple, we are considering only a small fragment of the policy object which contains 
only one conflict. In case of full validation, only the policy object is sent to the 
USEValidationComponent. During the process of creating invariants, an instance of the 
template class SimpleSSoDConstraint will be created for each constraint of type 
SimpleSSoD read from the policy object. In our example policy object there is only one 
authorization constraint specified between lines 20-25. The aforementioned 
SimpleSSoDConstraint instance will produce the following OCL invariant, which is 
then added to the USE model: 
 
context User inv simplessod_uniqueID: 
let 
  Clerk:Role=Role.allInstances->any 
(id='Clerk'), 
  Supervisor:Role=Role.allInstances>any 
(id='Supervisor'), 
  CR:Set(Role)=Set{Clerk, Supervisor} 
in 
  self.role_->intersection(CR)->size()< CR->size() 
 
While checking invariants in the USE system state, the invariant 
simplessod_uniqueID is evaluated to false.  The SimpleSSoDConstraint instance 
corresponding to the invariant simplessod_uniqueID will therefore generate an XML 
message as shown in Figure 8. In the XML message, we also need to indicate all those users 
who are assigned to the critical role set comprised of the Clerk and Supervisor roles. In 
other words, we need to indicate all those users who are violating the 
simplessod_uniqueID invariant. However, the SimpleSSoDConstraint instance 
only holds the critical role set, and is not aware of the users that are assigned to the critical role 
set. While OCL queries play an important role in retrieving specific information from the USE 
system state, some of the template classes contain preformatted OCL queries. These queries 
acquire concrete values from the corresponding template class instances. For example, in the 
above case, the SimpleSSoDConstraint instance contains the critical role set and it will 
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dynamically build the following concrete OCL query, which is then executed on the USE 
system state: 
 
let 
  Clerk:Role=Role.allInstances->any(id ='Clerk'), 
  Supervisor:Role=Role.allInstances->any 
    (id ='Supervisor'), 
  cr : Set(Role)=Set{Clerk,Supervisor} 
in  
  User.allInstances->reject(u| u.role_->intersection 
    (cr)->size()< cr-> size())->iterate(u:User; 
      result:Set(String)=oclEmpty(Set(String))| 
        result->union(Set{u.id})) 
 
The query will return a set of users that are assigned to the critical role set. In our case, the 
resulting set would contain only one user named “Smith”. 
There is also a way to automate the process of generating queries from the authorization 
constraints formulated as OCL invariants. For example, if you take a look at the SoD 
constraints given in Figure 2, you can see that they are of the form 
 
context C inv: 
let 
 … 
in 
  condition 
 
For the feedback of the USE system, we are interested in instances of the class C which are 
violating the condition. Thus, we can obtain a corresponding query of the following form: 
 
let 
… 
in 
     C.allInstances->reject(c| condition) 
 
Note that all self expressions must be replaced by the instance c because we do not have 
a context here. 
4.5 Lesson Learned 
We demonstrated that it is possible to integrate USE functionality with an industrial RBAC 
administration tool. The strength of this approach lies in its flexibility, i.e., various forms of 
static SoD can be implemented and new forms can be added relatively easily. Due to the fact 
that we always create a new USE system state to validate a policy object, this approach may 
slow down the RBAC administration task if the underlying policy object of larger size has to 
be validated automatically for each administrative operation. Therefore, an offline validation is 
also provided, that is, a policy object can be validated at once before the deployment.  
The main work in this approach remained to produce understandable warning/error 
messages, i.e., to interpret the feedback from USE. For each type of authorization constraint, 
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specially tailored messages must be constructed (cp. Section 4.4). However, we gave in 
Section 4.4 a scheme how to automate the process of retrieving feedback from USE.  
Furthermore, there are other tasks that could be carried out with the help of USE. For 
example, one might want to check if administrative RBAC operations have unexpected side 
effects. For example, a permission might be revoked from a role r, and as an unexpected side 
effect, it might also be revoked from a role senior to r. Thus, the query functionality would be 
helpful to detect such effects. Due to the fact that only a few side effect checks have been 
considered in ORKA, it was decided not to utilize USE for that purpose, but implement such 
checks in an ad hoc fashion. 
5 Related Work 
There is a plethora of works in the context of embedding RBAC into UML/OCL such as [13, 
14, 15, 16]. In addition, our results presented in this paper are based upon our earlier work 
[12]. There, we showed how to build an authorization engine by means of the USE 
functionality. In contrast, the focus of this paper lies more on integrating the USE functionality 
with an industrial RBAC administration tool.  
As indicated above, the USE system is a general-purpose validation tool and can hence be 
employed for the other UML/OCL encodings of RBAC policies mentioned above. In 
particular, Basin et al. present a modeling language SecureUML for integrating the 
specification of access control into application models [13]. Extending their work, Basin et al. 
present a validation approach, which allows one to automatically analyze RBAC policies 
formulated in UML/OCL [17]. OCL queries on RBAC policies can be automatically 
evaluated, i.e., RBAC policies can be tested for non-trivial access control requirements. The 
theoretical foundations of queries are given through meta-modeling. In addition, a validation 
tool, called SecureMOVA, is made available for checking RBAC policies. Similarly, our 
RBAC admin tool could be extended with such a query functionality to check access control 
requirements (beyond static SoD properties).  
RBAC functionality is also incorporated into many products such as operating systems, 
applications (e.g., clinical information systems, banking software), and databases. Specifically, 
enterprise administration tools such as DirXMetaRole from Siemens [18], or the Jupiter 
system from Beta Systems [19] support RBAC. However, most of these engines only 
implement basic RBAC concepts. If authorization constraints are supported at all, they are 
mostly limited to Simple Static SoD (which is also defined in the ANSI standard for RBAC 
[2]). Other types of authorization constraints are rarely implemented. 
In addition, a comparison of our work with XACML is also worthwhile. XACML is an 
OASIS standard that supports the specification of authorization policies and related queries in 
a standardized, machine-readable way [22]. The RBAC profile of XACML 2.0 extends the 
standard for expressing authorization policies that use RBAC with a scope limited to core and 
hierarchical RBAC [23]. UML/OCL, however, is a standard modelling approach that can be 
used to express the RBAC policies more abstractly in a human-readable way. Specifically, 
OCL can be used to express various kinds of role-based authorization constraints, whereas the 
RBAC profile of XACML 2.0 lacks the full support of SOD constraints and other variations of 
authorization constraints. It could be argued that RBAC policies can be specified directly in 
XACML. However, manually specifying such policies directly in XACML could be 
comparatively complicated and time consuming. 
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6 Conclusions and Outlook 
We demonstrated in this paper how to implement advanced administrative RBAC functionality 
by means of the USE tool. In particular, static authorization constraints such as Simple Static 
SoD and Permission-Based Static SoD have been implemented with the help of this approach. 
Other types of authorization constraints such as cardinality constraints can also be 
implemented. This way, the RBAC administration tool is extensible and helps to keep RBAC 
policies consistent with respect to defined authorization constraints. Implementing the static 
authorization constraints is comparatively easy with the USE tool. However, in case of 
authorization constraint violation(s) the essential requirement is to retrieve the relevant 
information from the USE system and to generate adequate error messages for the ORKA-
Admin tool. Due to the fact that the RBAC administration tool is still being developed within 
the frameworks of a research project with industrial partners there is hope that OCL 
functionality will be used in security products in the future. 
In addition, USE functionality can also be employed for implementing dynamic 
authorization constraints such as History-Based SoD [20]. This way, a policy decision point 
for workflow engines [21] can be realized based upon an OCL tool. This, however, remains 
future work.  Other RBAC encodings such as SecureUML could also be implemented through 
our USE approach. Last but not least, our approach is not restricted to RBAC or IT security in 
general. It could also be applied to problems in other domains such as safety-critical systems. 
References 
1. R. Sandhu, E. Coyne, H. Feinstein, C. Youman. Role-based access control models, IEEE Computer, 
vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 38–47, Feb. 1996. 
2. American National Standards Institute Inc. Role Based Access Control, ANSI-INCITS 359-2004, 
2004. 
3. D.F. Ferraiolo, D.R. Kuhn, R. Chandramouli, Role-based access control, Artec House, Boston, 2003. 
4. D. Ferraiolo, D. Gilbert, N. Lynch. An examination of federal and commercial access control policy 
needs, in Proc. of the NIST-NCSC Nat. (U.S.) Comp. Security Conference, 1993, pp. 107–116. 
5. G.-J. Ahn. The RCL 2000 language for specifying role-based authorization constraints, Ph.D. 
dissertation, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, 1999. 
6. V. D. Gligor, S. I. Gavrila, D. Ferraiolo. On the formal definition of separation-of-duty policies and 
their composition. In 1998 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 1998, pp. 172–185. 
7. K. Sohr, M. Drouineaud, G.-J. Ahn. Formal Specification of Role-based Security Policies for Clinical 
Information Systems, Santa Fe, New Mexico, in Proc. of the 20th  ACM Symposium on Applied 
Computing, 2005. 
8. J. Joshi, E. Bertino, U. Latif, A. Ghafoor. A generalized temporal role-based access control model. 
IEEE Trans. Knowl. Data Eng., vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 4–23, 2005. 
9. T. Jaeger and J. Tidswell. Practical Safety in Flexible Access Control Models, ACM Trans. 
Information and System Security, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 158-190, May 2001. 
10.Parks Informatik. The Parks Security Manager, 2008  
 http://www.parks-informatik.de/de/product/psm/ParksSecurityManagement.html 
11.M. Richters. A Precise Approach to Validating UML Models and OCL Constraints. PhD thesis. 
Universität Bremen. Logos-Verlag, Berlin, BISS Monographs, No. 14. 2002. 
12.K. Sohr, M. Drouineaud, G.-J. Ahn, M. Gogolla. Analyzing and Managing Role-Based Access 
Control Policies, IEEE Trans. Knowl. Data Eng., vol. 20., no 7, 2008. 
13.T. Lodderstedt, D. Basin, J. Doser. SecureUML: A UML-Based Modeling Language for Model-
Driven Security, UML, 5th International Conference. Vol. 2460. Dresden, Germany, pp.426-441, 
2002. 
  
 Implementing Advanced RBAC Administration Functionality with USE 
Proc. OCL 2008 19 / 19 
14.I. Ray, N. Li, R. France, D.-K. Kim. Using UML to visualize role-based access control constraints. In 
Proc. of the 9th ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies, pp. 115–124, USA, 
2004. 
15.T. Priebe, W. Dobmeier, B. Muschall, G. Pernul. ABAC - Ein Referenzmodell für attributbasierte 
Zugriffskontrolle, Sicherheit 2005, pp. 285-296. 
16.Gail-Joon Ahn , Michael E. Shin, Role-Based Authorization Constraints Specification Using Object 
Constraint Language, Proceedings of the 10th IEEE International Workshops on Enabling 
Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises, p.157-162, June 20-22, 2001.   
17.David Basin and Manuel Clavel and Jürgen Doser and Marina Egea. Automated Analysis of  
Security-Design Models. In Information and Software Technology, 2008.  
18.Siemens AG. DirXMetaRole Administration Guide. 
19.Beta Systems Software AG. SAM Jupiter User Guide, 2008 
 http://ww2.betasystems.com/de/produkte/idm/produkte/sam_jupiter.html 
20.R. Simon, M. Zurko. Separation of duty in role-based environments, In 10th IEEE Computer 
Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW ’97), June 1997, pp. 183–194. 
21.Project ORKA. http://www.orka-projekt.de/index-en.htm 
22.OASIS. eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML), Vers. 2.0, February 2005. 
23.A. Anderson. Core and hierarchical role based access control (RBAC) profile of XACML v2.0,  
    OASIS Standard, 2005. 
